Trinity College

Trinity College Digital Repository
Faculty Scholarship
4-2014

China and South Asia: Contention and Cooperation Between Giant
Neighbours
Xiangming Chen
Trinity College, xiangming.chen@trincoll.edu

Pallavi Banerjee
Gaurav I. Toor
Trinity College, gauravinder.toor@trincoll.edu

Ned Downie

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/facpub
Part of the Asian Studies Commons

China and South Asia: Contention and
Cooperation Between Giant Neighbours
By Editor1 • Apr 23rd, 2014 • Category: Economics & Politics, New
By Xiangming Chen, Pallavi Banerjee, Gaurav Toor and Ned Downie
Are China and India allies or enemies in the South Asian economy? Well, it seems they
are both; working together in healthy and profitable partnerships while maintaining
armies in the contested China-India borders. This article explains the paradoxical nature
of the China-India relationship and its impact and implications for the smaller countries
in South Asia and neighboring Southeast Asia.
The rise of China and India over the last two or three decades continues to make global news
headlines. Competition between these two global powers in economic, political and diplomatic
domains has garnered scholarly and media attention. Yet we know much less about China’s
growing ties and contention with India that are also spreading across the South Asia
subcontinent and beyond. As China-India trade has grown, India in 2006 opened the historical
trade route, Nathula Pass, which had remained closed for almost 50 years as a result of a
border war with China in 1962. Today in the presence of several persistently disputed border
zones in South Asia (see Map 1), China is beginning to build dams on the rivers in the Tibetan
Plateau, including the upper Brahmaputra (yarlung tsangpo or Yarlung River), which could
impact populations living downstream in India and Bangladesh (see Map 1). China has taken
over the construction of Gwadar Port in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, on the Arabian
Sea. China has also begun building the Gwadar road corridor all the way north to Xinjiang.

These developments in South Asia are not unusual considering that China has expanded its
trade ties with many developing countries, secured more energy supplies from them and built
extensive transport and urban infrastructure (roads and municipal buildings) there in recent
years.1 At first glance, China’s growing presence in South Asia is part and parcel of its global
reach of economic activities. A closer look reveals distinctive regional challenges facing China in
the presence and growth of India as a major geopolitical power. Unlike in any other world
region, China has to contend with India, not so much in direct economic competition but rather
in restricting the latter versus its long-time ally Pakistan, thus maintaining a rough balance of
power in South Asia.2 This broad geopolitical concern shadows any moves of China and India
and their impact in the region.
“China has to contend with India, not so much in direct economic competition but rather
in restricting the latter versus its long-time ally Pakistan, thus maintaining a rough
balance of power in South Asia.”
Contention between China and India is critical to the South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), which was set up to promote trade and other economic cooperation
among the South Asian countries.3 While India is reluctant to admit China from its observer
status to a full member, the other members, especially Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal want
China to join – as a counter to India. Not being a full member of SAARC may limit China’s trade
with India, whose volume ranked behind smaller Asian economies like Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand as recently as 2012 (see Table 1 on next spread), even though India led all South
Asian countries in growth oftrade with East Asia, especially China during 1990-2012.
As China and India continue to grow their bilateral trade, they have become co-leaders of the
BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) Corridor project. Following two meetings between
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart Li Keqiang, in New Delhi in
May and in Beijing in October 2013, China and India have turned the BCIM project, which had
been mired in scholarly discussions in the four countries, into a crucial official initiative.
Designed to link China and India with Bangladesh and Myanmar, the BCIM project will take the
form of an economic corridor that will run from Kunming to Kolkata and then extend all the way
to and through Mandalay in Myanmar, and Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh (see Map
2).4 The main driver of this trans-border regional project is China, which used Kunming, the
capital city of Yunnan province bordering Tibet and Myanmar, to launch the first-ever ChinaSouth Asia Exposition in June 2013 (see Photo 1). In terms of geographical proximity and
symbolic significance, Kunming serves the most convenient regional platform for China to
strengthen and deepen its economic ties with South Asia. The BCIM project illustrates the
under-recognized importance for examining China’s efforts to engage its South Asian
neighbours across multiple borders, with the India-China border being the most important for
both its lasting tension and potential new opportunities.

A Contested Borderland
The India–China border stretches across the entire snowy range of Himalayas from the North to
Northeast regions of India. When Britain ended her colonial rule over India, she left behind a
fraught legacy of arbitrarily drawn borders between countries in South Asia. For decades now
these borders have caused bilateral tensions between India and other surrounding countries
particularly China,Pakistan and Bangladesh.
In their 2012 paper on India-China and India-Bangladesh borderlands, Pallavi Banerjee and
Xiangming Chen argued, “…the security concerns at the borderlands still shape how the nations
react to each other.”5 The brewing tension between India and China since the mid-1940s led to
the Sino-India frontier war of 1962. In the aftermath of the war, China retained most of its claim
in Aksai Chin (marking the region at the junction of China, India and Pakistan). India maintained
its claim over 70% of the land in the Northeast Frontier under dispute in 1947 when Britain
withdrew from India. The 1962 war spurred India and China to treat their mutual borderlands as
critical frontiers for national security. The armies of both countries remain deployed on the
borders, especially in the strategic town of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh in India (see Map 1).
China claims Tawang for being the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. India has not laid claim
on Manasarovar which is located in China and considered a Hindu pilgrimage site of great
significance.6 However, India pushed toward building an artery of roads and military bases along
the critical areas where it felt vulnerable to China.
Since the war, the India-China border areas along the State of Arunachal Pradesh have
experienced sporadic tensions. In the last few years, Chinese officials are calling the far
northeastern part of Arunachal Pradesh, “South Tibet.”7 This has infuriated India, which
perceives this attempt to rename as a territorial claim by China. The continued disagreement on
the demarcation of the borderland has ensured that the relationship between India and China
remains volatile and the borders contested with imminent danger of military action.

Despite the long-standing border disputes, India and China have emerged as major economic
powers and competitors in the region. Since the 1980 economic reforms in China and the 1990
liberalization of the Indian economy, governments on both sides have pushed to invest in transborder trade opportunities. As documented by Banerjee and Chen,8 “in an attempt to develop
the underdeveloped regions near the border between Southwest China and Northeast India and
increase trade linkages, China has been promoting the Kunming (City) Initiative (now the BCIM
Forum advancing the corridor project) to strengthen regional economic cooperation and cultural
exchange between the contiguous regions of Eastern/Northeastern India, China’s Southwest,
Myanmar and Bangladesh.” China has emphasized the advantages of trans-border trade,
tourism and transport linkages, investing in building access routes by land (railways) and sea to
South Asia and the Bay of Bengal.9 China is now India’s second largest trading partner after the
United States.
“Water is essential to agriculture in China (137 million hectares of arable land) and India
(161 million hectares of arable land) with a majority of citizens relying on agriculture for
income.”
So what does the paradoxical nature of the India-China relationship (persistent border disputes
co-existing with surging trade/economic relationships) mean for people living in the
borderlands? Border residents are largely unfazed by the ongoing disputes even though the
living conditions in the area are not ideal. 10 The governments have no stake in developing
these borderlands. The civic resources are scarce, threats of military action loom large and the
terrain remains harsh. In reaction to the conditions, the border residents downplay the bilateral
sanctity of the border, crossing between them often covertly, to access material resources on
either side. They have little allegiance to the nation-states or their politics but make the best of
the situation by establishing economic and cultural relationship across the borders, rendering
the borders open despite the ongoing contestations. It is up to the two countries to resolve the
geopolitical border conflicts and encourage the already existing friendly cross-border relations.

Firing Conflict with Water
On April 15, 2013, a 19-km strip of land, barren and cold, with no apparent strategic importance,
caught national attention in India and became the symbol of Chinese aggression after People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers intruded on alleged Indian territory in Ladakh.11 Though border
issues grab attention, the water conflict between the two countries is developing at a much
faster rate and will have a greater impact in the coming years. On March 1, the Arunachal
Pradesh government reported that the Brahmaputra River was drying up due to alleged
malpractices of Chinese dams.12 Although this report was disputed by the Indian government
two months later, it generated attention in China and other circles.13 If the river was indeed
rerouted, as an Indian analyst would say, it would “be akin to a declaration of water war on India
and Bangladesh.”14 Similar to border issues, the Sino-Indian water conflict arises due to a lack
of an institutionalized approach and meaningful dialogue to solve water issues.
The gravity of the Sino-Indian border-intensive conflict is immense. Asia is the driest continent
with the lowest per capita freshwater availability, around 3,190 cubic metres (less than half of
the global average). On the other hand, its irrigation practices have amounted to three fourths of
the world’s irrigated land. Water is essential to agriculture in China (137 million hectares of
arable land) and India (161 million hectares of arable land) with a majority of citizens relying on
agriculture for income. Beyond rural needs, urbanization and a growing middle class have offset
the reduced pressure of slowing population growth in the two countries on water. With growing
water needs from industrial hubs and for consumption purposes, India and China will likely try to
harness the resource at a much faster rate. As such, the Brahmaputra River has become the
centrepiece of Sino-Indian geoeconomic maneuvering with Indians at a natural disadvantage of
being a downstream partner.

China’s unilateral approach to dam-building decisions has become an issue of national security.
Indians find any dam creation on the Chinese side akin to a hostage situation where the PLA
could use the dams to its strategic advantage. Similarly, the Chinese believe dams in Arunachal

Pradesh amount to diplomatic sabotage in a disputed area of ‘South Tibet.’ The river is of such
importance that the Chinese government has repeatedly announced its unilateral approach15 to
harness the ‘Great Bend’ on the river near the Indian border (see Map 1) with a 38,000
Megawatts (MW) Metog Dam. This project, though dormant as of now, would have fed into the
drying Yellow River in Northern China but would have severely impacted livelihoods of hundreds
of millions in East India and Bangladesh. Nonetheless, the Chinese announced the creation of
three dams on the Brahmaputra, all near the Indian border, without any consultation with the
Indian authorities. After India lodged complaints against this unilateral approach and suggested
an information sharing mechanism, the Chinese side responded with facts of dam designs and
a rejection of creating new mechanisms.16
Even flood data sharing mechanisms are temporary and subject to periodic agreements.
Compared to China’s relationship with the Mekong River countries,17 the conflict over the
Brahmaputra River shows that the Sino-Indian dialogue is more reactionary than it is a process.
Moreover, unlike the unified approach Mekong Basin countries adopt, India’s fragmented
relations with its South Asian neighbours decreases the diplomatic weight needed to ignite the
creation of water institutions.
In a vast region with several major rivers crossing multiple national boundaries, the heavy
construction of dams presents major challenges. With several hundred dams being proposed or
planned for the region, it could lead to capacity additions of over 150,000 MW in the next 20
years. But it could also generate disastrous ecological consequences. “Submergence of lands,
homes, fields and forests on a large scale will displace hundreds of thousands of people.
Damming and diversion of rivers will severely disrupt the downstream flows, impacting
agriculture and fisheries and threatening livelihoods of entire populations.”18Given their low level
of development and high level of poverty, South Asian countries have few other choices than
building dams to generate electricity, and in the case of Nepal and Bhutan, exporting it to India.
This is very similar to Laos building dams on its segment of the Mekong River to export
electricity to Thailand, with financing and construction from China.19
“After ten years of stalling, the Myanmese officials have finally committed to completing
a trilateral highway project with India and Thailand by 2016 that could increase IndiaASEAN trade by $100 million over five years.”
Looking East and Going Southeast
China’s incursions into South and Southeast Asia worry Indian policymakers who fear that an
Asia under Chinese hegemony would end India’s ambitions of becoming a global power and
severely curtail its regional influence.
These concerns are an important force behind India’s “Look East Policy” (LEP), a post-Cold
War initiative that centres Indian foreign policy around stronger engagement with its neighbours
to its east.20 During the Cold War, India was an isolated figure in Asian geopolitics. But the
demise of the Soviet Union, as well as a flagging economy at home, forced India into two policy
revolutions in the early 1990s: liberalization to fix the economy and the LEP to strengthen links
with Southeast and East Asia. Implementation of the LEP was slow in its first decade, as the
Indian policy establishment struggled to formulate concrete aims for the initiative. 21 The past ten
years have been more successful, with policymakers shifting away from the early emphasis on
trade and investment promotion to a broader package of economic and security
concerns.22 India’s ties with ASEAN have improved considerably under the watch of the LEP;
trade reached $68 billion in 2011, from a baseline of $3.1 billion in 1991. But this volume does

not establish India as a regional force commensurate with its global ambitions. China-ASEAN
trade in 2011 was four times as large. Yet recent changes in Asia’s strategic environment may
favour a stronger role for India in Southeast Asia. Incidents such as the ongoing South China
Sea dispute have spurred a succession of security cooperation initiatives between India and
ASEAN nations who hope a more active India might help counter Chinese
influence.23 Myanmar’s opening up also promises a new land bridge between India and ASEAN.
After ten years of stalling, the Myanmese officials have finally committed to completing a
trilateral highway project with India and Thailand by 2016 that could increase India-ASEAN
trade by $100 million over five years.24
Stronger ties with Southeast Asia are just one component of India’s efforts to reorganize the
regional geography of Asia. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC), launched in 1997, includes seven geographically contiguous South
and Southeast Asian countries: India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and
Thailand. These members established a framework for a free trade agreement in 2004 and
target completion by 2017. The BCIM corridor mentioned above could be even more
transformative.25 The corridor retraces and revives much of the ancient “Southern Silk Road,”
dating from 200 BCE, and the Ledo or Stilwell Road (see Map 2), a World War II-era road that
supplied military equipment from Assam and British India to Chinese Nationalist forces fighting
Japan.26 Representatives from Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar met in December 2013
for the first round of official-level talks to set a timetable for the multi-billion dollar initiative; they
hope to establish a cooperation framework by late 2014 to set the stage for on-the-ground work.
Long-term aims include multi-modal transport networks across land, sea and air that will
significantly shorten transit times for Chinese and Indian exports. Goods from China’s
landlocked Yunnan province will gain faster overland access to the Bay of Bengal. Meanwhile,
goods from India’s northeast right now take seven days to move by road to the Kolkata port, and
then another three to four weeks to move by sea to China; the reopening of the Stilwell Road
will allow them to reach Yunnan in less than two days, while reducing transport costs by about
30%.27 Bangladesh also stands to benefit from the coastal shipping line as the movement of
basic commodities would be much cheaper and faster.28

But success for the BCIM corridor will require enormous changes in the political and economic
environment of Northeast India. The region is a crucial starting point and link in the BCIM
corridor, but it suffers from weak infrastructure, poverty levels from 40-60%, and as many as
109 ethnic insurgencies.29 At best, the corridor could bring an economic boost to the Northeast
akin to what stronger trade links with Southeast Asia have brought to China’s Southwest. But
making this happen would involve reversing Delhi’s longstanding strategy towards the region, a
mixture of economic neglect and military heavy-handedness.
Though it supports the BCIM corridor, India is concerned that too much Chinese access to
India’s underdeveloped border states will limit the potential of the corridor as a spur for growth.
According to Binoda Kumar Mishra, director of India’s Centre for Studies in International
Relations and Development, “as Yunnan is the most advanced in the cluster, India fears that it
will become BCIM’s economic centre, with the rest of the region reduced to its
periphery.”30 Staging the first China-South Asia Expo in Kunming in June 2013 (Photo 1) served
as southwestern China’s platform for connecting to and expanding into South Asia. India lacks
the geopolitical and economic heft to fully match China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia.
But the shifting geopolitics of Asia are offering India new opportunities to strengthen integration
with its eastern neighbours and developing its own poor northeastern region.
Hang Together or Hang Seperately
As China and India seek a balance between cooperation and contention in South Asia, their
respective positions in the region are complicated by their varied cross-border linkages with the
other neighbouring countries, as well as their competition for exerting a greater influence on
these countries. Despite being archrivals, India and Pakistan have decided to open the WagahAttari border for 24/7 trade and allow containers to be moved right up to Amritsar and Lahore
instead of being unloaded at the check-post and re-loaded on the other side.31 This move will
help smoothen trade between the two countries. A long-standing backyard for India, Nepal has
become economically closer to China, which overtook India to become the largest foreign
investor in Nepal during the second half of 2013.
“India’s ties with ASEAN have improved considerably under the watch of the LEP; trade
reached $68 billion in 2011, from a baseline of $3.1 billion in 1991. But this volume does
not establish India as a regional force commensurate with its global ambitions. ChinaASEAN trade in 2011 was four times as large.”
China made a more significant move to establish a strong foothold in South Asia when it took
over the upgrading and operation of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port in 2013. The Gwadar project
serves China’s “look west” policy while allowing Pakistan to “look east.” China is building a road
from Gwadar all the way north to Kashgar or Kashi, the westernmost large city in Xinjiang,
China near the borders to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (see Map 3). Pakistan and China also plan
to connect the port via the Indus Highway, around 414 km from the China-Pakistan border and
further reaches to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. This will provide China with a landbased supply of oil from Central Asia. Given its geographical location, Gwadar cuts China’s
distance from the Persian Gulf, from which China gets 60% of its oil, by thousands of
kilometres. Gwadar is already connected to Karachi through the Makran coastal highway, built
with $200 million in Chinese assistance.
Overall Gwadar Port offers existing and new transport connections for moving commercial and
other traffic to and through the Central Asian states, Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Persian
Gulf, China, Iran and Southeast Asia (Map 3).32

“Goods from India’s northeast right now take seven days to move by road to the Kolkata
port, and then another three to four weeks to move by sea to China; the reopening of the
Stilwell Road will allow them to reach Yunnan in less than two days, while reducing
transport costs by about 30%.”
While the economic rise of China and India is felt globally, it is in South Asia where the two
emerging powers both contend and cooperate with each other while wielding competing
influence on the neighbouring countries. Despite the legacy from the 1962 border war, China
and India have come a long way in improving their bilateral relationship, especially under India’s
current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. To build on
this momentum, India has designated 2014 as the “Year of Friendly Exchanges” between India
and China. This optimism aside, the two key players are bumping into each other’s strategic
interests as India and Bangladesh look east and China moves west and south. It is up to the two
giant neighbours to manage their competition by enhancing their cooperative activities and ties.
If they can do that, they will foster more favourable spaces of shared development and
prosperity for their smaller neighbours in the region.
We would like to thank Kayla Chen for her editorial reading of the article and Mustafa Ibraheem
at Trinity College for his excellent work on the maps.
About the Authors
Xiangming Chen is the founding Dean and Director of the Center for Urban and Global
Studies and Paul E. Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies and Sociology at
Trinity College, Connecticut, and a distinguished guest professor at Fudan University, Shanghai.
He has published extensively on urbanization and globalization with a focus on China and Asia.
His several books include As Borders Bend: Transnational Spaces on the Pacific Rim (Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 2005) and Shanghai Rising: State Power and Local Transformations in a
Global Megacity (University of Minnesota Press, 2009; Chinese Edition, 2009).
Pallavi Banerjee (PhD, Sociology, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2012) is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Sociology Department of Vanderbilt University. Her research interests are
situated at the intersection of sociology of immigration, gender, transnational labor, minority
families, globalization, South and South East Asia. She is currently working on a book
manuscript entitled: Dismantling Dependence: Gendered Migration of Indian Professional
Families to the United States, which explores how certain immigration policies and visa regimes
shape the lived experiences of families of migrant Indian professional workers in the US.
Gaurav Inder S. Toor is a member of Class of 2014 at Trinity College, Connecticut majoring in
Political Science and Economics with a minor in Urban Studies. Besides the United States, his
undergraduate studies have spanned over India (Ramjas College, University of Delhi), China
(River Cities of the Yangtze Program), and United Kingdom (Worcester College, Oxford
University). He is fluent in three regional languages of India, and has conducted fieldwork in
China, India and Kenya. He has been a student researcher at the Center for Urban and Global
Studies at Trinity College since 2011, and will start his graduate studies in the Ph.D. program in
Government at Cornell University in fall 2014.
Ned Downie is a member of the Yale College Class of 2014, majoring in Ethics, Politics, and
Economics. He serves as a research assistant for Paul Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth
Professor of History and author of Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers. He has written

for Foreign Policy, the Yale Review of International Studies, and the Yale Daily News. He has
carried out field research in northeast China and speaks fluent Mandarin.

References
1. See Kayla Chen and Xiangming Chen, “China and Latin America: Connected and
Competing.” The European Financial Review (February 2013): 56-58; Fakhmiddin Fazilov and
Xiangming Chen, “China and Central Asia: A Significant New Energy Nexus.” The European
Financial Review (April 2013): 38-43; Xiangming Chen and Curtis Stone, “China and Southeast
Asia: Unbalanced Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion.” The European Financial
Review (August 2013): 7-11; Xiangming Chen and Garth Myers, “China and Africa: The Crucial
Urban Connection.” The European Financial Review(December 2013): 89-93; Abbās Varij
Kāzemi and Xiangming Chen, “China and the Middle East: More Than Oil.” The European
Financial Review (February 2014): 40-44.
2. Michael R. Chambers, “Rising China: A Threat to Its Neighbors?” Pp. 65-91 in The Rise of
China in Asia: Strategic Implications, edited by Carolyn W. Pumphrey. The Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA (January 2002).
3. Formally established in 1985, the eight-member body currently comprises Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and has nine observers:
China, Japan, South Korea, Myanmar, Australia, Iran, Mauritius, the European Union and the
United States.
4. “BCIM corridor gets push after first official-level talks in China,” The Hindu, 21 December,
2013; accessed from www.thehindu.com.
5. Pallavi Banerjee and Xiangming Chen, “Living in In-Between Spaces: A Structure-Agency
Analysis of the India-China and India-Bangladesh Borderlands.” Cities: An International Journal
of Public Planning and Policy 34 (2012): 18-29.
6.Abanti Bhattacharya, “India-China talks: Why soft border is not an option – analysis,” The
Eurasian Review, 6 March, 2014; accessed from http://www.eurasiareview.com/06032014india-china-talks-soft-border-optionanalysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiarevi
ew%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29.
7. “Indian, Pakistani and Chinese border disputes: Fantasy frontiers,” The Economist, 8
February,
2012
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_disp
utes
8. Ibid.
9. N. Kurian, “Prospects for Sino-Indian trans-border economic.” International Studies 42 (2005):
295–306; Times of India “Beijing-Lhasa Rail Line,” 2 November, 2010; accessed
from<http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=2006&m=11&p=2_4>.
10. Ibid.
11. “China ends stand-off, pulls out troops from Daulat Beg Oldi Sector.” The Hindu, 5 May,
2013.
12. “Brahmaputra dries up in Arunachal Pradesh Town! Is China responsible?” Economic
Times, 1 March, 2012.
13. Mark Christopher. Water Wars: The Brahmaputra River and Sino-Indian Relations Case
Study(2013) Newport, RI: US Naval War College, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed
Groups.
14. Brahma Chellaney, “The Sino-Indian Water Divide.” Project Syndicate. 3 August, 2009.
15. Official excursion in 2003, officially blessed book Tibet’s Waters Will Save Us in 2005
16. “China Spikes India’s Proposal for Joint Mechanism on Brahmaputra.” The Hindu, 17 April,
2013.

17. Selina Ho, “River Politics: China’s Policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in
Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Contemporary China 23 (2014): 1-20.
18. Mountains of Concrete: Dam Building in the Himalayas, published by International Rivers,
Berkeley, CA, 28 December (2008): 3.
19. “Xiangming Chen and Curtis Stone, “China and Southeast Asia: Unbalanced Development
in the Greater Mekong Subregion.” The European Financial Review (August 2013): 7-11.
20. Christophe Jaffrelot, “India’s Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective,” India
Review2: 2 (2009). 35-68; Anuradha Bhattarcharjee, “India’s Look East Policy: Relations with
Vietnam,” European Institute for Asian Studies Briefing Paper, July 2012.
21. G.V.C. Naidu, “India and East Asia: The Look East Policy,” Perceptions 18:1 (2013): 53-74;
S.D. Muni, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy: The Strategic Dimension,” National University of
Singapore Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper, February 2011.
22. C. Raja Mohan, “Look East policy: phase two,” The Hindu, 9 October, 2003; Shibashis
Chatterjee, “Conceptions of Space in India’s Look East Policy: Order, Cooperation, or
Community?” South Asian Survey 14 (2007): 65-81.
23. Trefor Moss, “India’s ‘Look East’ power play,” The Diplomat, 23 February, 2012, accessed
from www.thediplomat.com; Saurav Jha, “India’s ASEAN Defense Sales Effort,” The
Diplomat, 20 November, 2013; Nitin Gokhale, “India’s Rising Regional Military
Engagement,” The Diplomat, 10 February, 2014.
24. “India to open super highway to Burma and Thailand,” The Telegraph, 29 May, 2012,
accessed from www.telegraph.co.uk; “India’s Delayed Trilateral Highway,” Asia Sentinel, 2
March, 2012, accessed from www.asiasentinel.com.
25. “BCIM economic corridor proposed by China,” United Press International, 24 October, 2013,
accessed from www.upi.com; “China, India push for BCIM corridor,” The BRICs Post, 21
December, 2013, accessed from www.thebricspost.com; “BCIM corridor gets push after first
official-level talks in China,” The Hindu, 21 December, 2013.
26. The road goes from Ledo in Assam through Jairampur and Nampong in Arunachal Pradesh
until it reaches the Pangsau Pass where it crosses into Myanmar. The road then weaves
through upper Myanmar to reach Myitkyina before turning east to China where it reaches
Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province. Roughly 61 km runs through India, 1,035 km through
Myanmar and 640 km in China. See Sudha Ramachandran, “Stilwell road to be reborn,” Asia
Times, 12 January, 2011.
27. Ibid.
28. Rupak Bhattacharjee, “Bangladesh: Looking east to play key regional role – analysis,” The
Eurasian Review, 8 March, 2014; accessed from http://www.eurasiareview.com/08032014bangladesh-looking-east-play-key-regional-roleanalysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiarevi
ew%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29.
29. Sanjib Baruah, “Postfrontier blues: Towards a new policy framework for Northeast India,”
East-West Center Washington Policy Studies No. 33 (2007).
30. Debasish Roy Chowdhury, “’Southern silk road’ linking China and India seen as key to
boosting ties,” South China Morning Post, 21 February, 2014.
31. “Pakistan, India agree to normalise trade ties,” The Frontier Post, 18 January, 2014;
accessed from www.thefrontierpost.com.
32. Salman Rafi Sheikh, “China expands its regional reach,” Asia Sentinel, 4 February, 2014,
accessed from www.AsiaSentinel.com.

